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SUMMARY
Operating system security has become a growing concern these days. As the complex-
ity of software layers increases, the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries
increases. Rootkits are gaining much attention these days in cyber-security. Rootk-
its are installed by an adversary after he/she gains elevated access to the computer
system. Rootkits are used to maintain a consistent undetectable presence in the
computer system and help as a toolkit to hide all the malware activities from the
system administrator and anti-malware tools. Current defense mechanism used to
prevent such activities is to strengthen the OS kernel and fix the known vulnerabil-
ities. Software tools are developed at the OS or virtual machine monitor (VMM)
levels to monitor the integrity of the kernel and try to catch any suspicious activity
after infection.
Recognizing the failure of software techniques and attempting to solve the end-
less war between the anti-rootkit and rootkit camps, in this thesis, we propose an
autonomic architecture called SHARK, or Secure Hardware support Against RootK-
its. This new hardware architecture provides system-level security against the stealth
activities of rootkits without trusting the entire software stack. It enhances the rela-
tionship of the OS and hardware and rules out the possibility of any hidden activity
even when the OS is completely compromised. SHARK proposes a novel hardware
manager that provides secure association with every software context making use of
hardware resources. It helps system administrators to obtain feedback directly from
the hardware to reveal all running processes. This direct feedback makes it impossible
for rootkits to conceal running software contexts from the system administrator.
ix
We emulated the proposed architecture SHARK by using Bochs hardware simula-
tor and a modified Linux kernel version 2.6.16.33 for the proposed architectural exten-
sion. In our emulated environment, we installed several real rootkits to compromise
the kernel and concealed malware processes. SHARK is shown to be very effective
in defending against a variety of rootkits employing different software schemes. Also,
we performed performance analysis using SIMICS simulations and the results show a
negligible overhead, making the proposed solution very practical.
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The security of an operating system directly affects the security of the entire com-
puting system and hence OS security is crucial. Kernel security is becoming critical
these days as the complexity of software systems has increased.
Currently, to warrant a safe OS kernel, efforts mainly focus the software, either
by changing the architecture of the OS kernel or by fixing the known vulnerabilities.
Due to the increasing complexity and the size of the OS, it is unrealistic to design
a monolithic OS without any vulnerabilities. On the other hand, researchers have
proposed intrusion detection systems (IDS) that aim at periodically monitoring the
integrity of critical software components. Although these techniques were sufficient
in the past, lately they have proven to be useless for emerging sophisticated attacks.
Also, we have recognized that defending against malware in the software stack is not a
proactive approach. The software stack is the common battle ground for both malware
and malware-detection systems - both trying to counteract each other. In fact, it is a
losing battle for software-detection schemes, as it is easy for future malware to devise
attacks against the present solution proposed by anti-malware camps, which results
in a never-ending loop in providing yet another software solution that will useless
in the future. To solve this problem permanently, the correct approach is to make
the hardware more security aware and enhance the relationship of the OS and the
hardware.
Rootkits are gaining more attention these days, as they are dangerous and difficult
to identify.Rootkits are not exploits to gain elevated access to the machine. They are
used to hide all the malware activities from the system administrator after an initial
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exploit. After an initial exploit, the adversary will gain elevated access to the machine
and he/she will gain the freedom to manipulate any software component of the soft-
ware stack. Rootkits are used to manipulate the operating system to enable hidden
malware activity and hide all the processes, network connections and files used by
malware. This helps the adversary make use of the computing resources consistently
and remain completely hidden from the system administrator. Typical applications
of rootkits include key loggers that collect passwords, utilities to conceal any mal-
ware, network traffic sniffers, utilities to gain control of zombie machines and devise
other attacks such as denial-of-service, email spamming, etc. Recent studies indi-
cate that there has been an exponential growth in the number of rootkit techniques,
and rootkits will conceal an overwhelming (84%) majority of malware by the end of
2008 [21]. After an initial exploit, the rootkit installs itself and conceals all the mal-
ware processes from the system administrator and software anti-malware tools. This
is achieved by manipulating the compromised kernel and hijacking all the utilities
used by system administrators. The system administrator will be under the illusion
of maintaining a clean system by observing a manipulated system state sitting at the
top of the corrupted software stack.
Researchers have proposed software techniques to address the rootkit issue at the
OS and virtual machine monitor levels [10, 31]. However, software-based solutions can
be easily circumvented, as this approach combats the problem at the same privilege
level with the kernel rootkits, which is ineffective for solving the issue once and for
all. Today, detecting virtualization- based rootkits [25] is a challenge in the security
research groups and has proved to be impossible to solve using software techniques.
This necessitates a micro-architectural solution to enhance the relationship of the
OS and hardware and provide direct feedback to the system administrator to reveal
software contexts making use of hardware resources to solve the problem of stealth
permanently. In this thesis, we propose SHARK, which stands for Secure Hardware
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Against RootKits, a process-context-aware architecture that has the capability to
identify every software context making use of hardware resources. When new pro-
cesses are created, these processes have to go through the secure hardware manager to
register themselves and then they always have to go through a process authentication
phase before making use of hardware resources. This enables hardware to identify ev-
ery software context making use of hardware resources at any point in time. The next
step is to provide direct feedback to the system administrator and expose the master
list of software contexts making use of hardware resources. The system administrator
can make use of this master list of processes exposed by hardware, which cannot be
manipulated, and compare it with the process listing returned by the OS. If the OS
is compromised, and the malware processes are hidden, this comparison will result in
a mismatch that can be used to trigger an alarm. As this solution is at the micro-
architectural level, any hidden software contexts at any layer of the software stack will
be revealed to the system administrator without having to rely on the compromised
OS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort that uses a synergistic micro-
architecture and OS technique to address rootkit exploits. The rest of the thesis is
organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of rootkits, the nature of stealth,
and existing anti-rootkit solutions. Chapter 3 introduces the explored solution space
we performed before we proposed the new architecture. Chapter 4 gives all the details
of the proposed architecture SHARK, and Chapter 5 discusses the implementation
details and the analyzes our experimental results. Chapter 6 talks about the related
work, Chapter 7 discusses the future work, and Chapter 8 provides the conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
ROOTKITS OVERVIEW
This chapter gives an overview of rootkits, the techniques used by rootkits to achieve
stealth in a compromised machine, the software anti-rootkit techniques proposed and
their weaknesses, and the emerging and future challenges.
A rootkit is a set of programs used by adversaries to achieve a permanent or co-
sistent undetectable presence on a machine. The attack scenario is as follows: The
adversary first uses a known kernel vulnerability to gain elevated access to the ma-
chine, and then installs rootkits to hide his traces from the system administrator and
anti-malware utilities. A rootkit’s function is to hide all traces of malware activ-
ity on the machine, which includes malware processes, network connections used by
malware, files used, and registry entries used by malware from system administrator
utilities.Malware uses rootkits as an enabler to hide its existence on the machine while
abusing all the hardware resources. Rootkits are of two types - memory based rootk-
its and persistent rootkits. Memory-based-rootkits will not survive a system reboot,
as they operate only on system memory and do not modify any files on disk. But
persistent rootkits change the persistent files on disk to load themselves on a system
reboot. It is comparatively easier for anti-rootkit tools to catch persistent rootkits by
checking the integrity of critical disk data before shutting down the machine. Rootk-
its are gaining more attention these days and are becoming serious security threats
because of the emerging sophisticated attacks.
In the next few sections, we classify different types of rootkits, provide an overview
of existing techniques to detect rootkits, and discuss why they are not sufficient to
tackle the emerging sophisticated rootkits.
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2.1 Common Exploit Techniques by Rootkits
Rootkits modify the execution flow of the OS to hide malware activities from the
system administrator. Rootkits can operate both in user space and kernel space,
depending on the exploitation level.Kernel mode rootkits are more detrimental than
user mode rootkits because of the unrestricted access privilege. They can manipulate
any software component via the compromised OS and hence are very hard to detect.
Rootkits use the following techniques to achieve malware’s stealth and subvert the
system.
2.1.1 Import Address Table Hooks (IAT):
An IAT hook is a technique that was commonly used by naive rootkits at the user
level. Import Address Table (IAT) contains function pointers that lead to the func-
tions in different shared libraries. When a user-level process makes a function call
that is implemented in a shared library, the IAT is traversed to get the address of
that particular function before transferring the control. User-level rootkits patch this
table to hook these function pointers and install trampoline functions to filter data.
2.1.2 System Service Descriptor Table Hooks (SSDT):
SSDT, also called a system call table, is in the kernel space, which contains function
pointers to handle different system calls. A kernel mode rootkit can modify these
SSDT entries and replace a function pointer with an address of its own to hijack the
system. Loadable kernel modules (LKMs) have access to SSDT, and hooking SSDT
is a simple and popular attack accomplished by LKMs. To know the system state, all
the system administrator utilities use system calls, and it is easy to intercept these
calls and filter data.
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2.1.3 Interrupt Descriptor Table Hooks (IDT):
IDT is another table in the kernel space used to store the interrupt handlers in the
kernel. The kernel mode rootkit can modify an entry in IDT to replace the legitimate
interrupt handler with the fake handler. Keylogging malware uses this technique
to intercept keystrokes of interest, e.g., passwords, social security numbers, bank
accounts, without any knowledge of the user.
2.1.4 Direct Kernel Object Modification (DKOM):
In the DKOM technique, the rootkit modifies the OS data objects directly to remove
the information pertaining to the processes the malware intends to hide. For example,
the rootkit can modify the linked list that the ”ps” command uses to find what
processes are running. It removes the node of the linked list that has information
about the malware process and hence the utility tools only see this manipulated linked
list and will not report any unintended use of computing resources. This technique
is hard to detect- because it is very difficult to track changes in the OS data.
2.2 Sophisticated Rootkits
Virtual memory subversion is a technique used by the Shadow Walker Rootkit [34]
in which the memory contents are faked when integrity-checking tools read the pages
occupied by malware. Typically, integrity-checking tools scan physical pages to watch
for any modification by malware. This rootkit tries to hide malware’s activities by
returning the original legitimate data when integrity-checking tools try to read these
pages. To accomplish this, the TLB is flushed for malware pages so that any memory
access to these malware pages walks through the page tables. The compromised OS
then manipulates the page table entries of these malware pages and invalidates the
PTEs so that there will be a page fault for every access to these malware pages. Then,
the patched page fault handler will differentiate between memory read and execute
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operations, return the original legitimate data if it is a non-execute memory access
or the modified contents if it is a memory-execute operation for malware to execute.
This makes all integrity-checking tools useless.
Subvirt is another complex rootkit that was recently demonstrated [16]. This
rootkit makes the host OS a virtual machine and installs a virtual machine monitor
below the host OS. To accomplish this, the boot files are modified so that when the
system reboots, VMM boots before the host OS starts and the VMM takes full control
of the host OS. The host OS will not even know that it is executing as a virtual
machine on top of a VMM. Also, this virtual machine-based rootkit installs other
guest malware OSes completely isolated from the original host OS. Bluepill is another
conceptual rootkit [29] that makes use of advanced hardware-assisted virtualization
support to take control of the host OS without changing any system files. Using secure
virtual machine (SVM) in AMD-V technology and Intel’s VT-X technology, Bluepill
installs a thin hypervisor below the host OS on-the-fly and downgrades the host OS to
become a virtual machine without modifying the boot files. It is proved that, today,
we cannot effectively prove or detect virtualization-based rootkits [25]. Cloaker [6]
is a recent rootkit that exploits hardware to conceal itself without modifying the OS
code and data. One of the hardware configuration registers is modified to change the
location of the interrupt service routines (ISRs) and install malware in this virtualized
environment without modifying the host OS image. Recognizing the sophistication of
these emerging rootkits, we propose a solution at micro-architectural level to control
all software layers above the bare hardware. This solution should be effective in
identifying hidden software contexts in any software layer, including the VMM or
hypervisor level.
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2.3 Software Anti-Rootkit Techniques
The existing software anti-rootkit techniques use one of the following methods to
examine the corrupted system and trigger an alarm:
2.3.1 Signature-based detection:
In this detection scheme, the memory is scanned to find the sequence of bytes that
comprise the fingerprint of known rootkits. If there is a match with known finger-
prints, an alarm is triggered. The downside of this approach is that it can be used to
detect only known rootkits with known fingerprints.
2.3.2 Heuristic/Behavioral detection:
In this scheme, a deviation of the expected normal system behavior is used as a clue
to detect potential suspicious activity. For example, using the execution time as one
heuristic, if the execution time of a system call has consistently increased, we can
infer that there is additional code inserted by malware and trigger an alarm. The
downside of this approach is that it triggers many false-positives because there can
be deviations in these heuristics that are not deterministic.
2.3.3 Cross-View-based detection:
In cross-view-based detection, a high-level system view obtained by high- level OS
functions is compared with a low-level system view obtained by very low level OS data.
Any mismatch triggers an alarm and concludes that the high -level OS view is changed
because of manipulation in intermediate OS layers. Rootkit Revealer [24], Klister [17],
Blacklight [3], and StriderGhostbuster [11] use this technique.This detection scheme
assumes that the low-level OS view cannot be modified by the rootkit and it cannot
get very complex. But today, rootkits are very complex and this detection scheme
will also fail.
8
2.3.4 Integrity-based detection:
In integrity-based schemes, a current snapshot of system memory is compared with a
trusted baseline. Any mismatch is taken as evidence of suspicious activity. Tripwire
and System Virginity Verifier [27] were developed based on this technique.
The approach followed by current software techniques is inherently flawed because
they operate in the same corrupted software stack. This results in a endless battle be-
tween rootkit and anti-rootkit camps. Subvirt, Shadow Walker, Bluepill, and Cloaker
are new rootkits that are very sophisticated and indicate the complexity of future
rootkits.
2.4 Hardware Anti-Rootkit Techniques
The Copilot hardware detection scheme [23] followed the right approach of having
an OS-independent hardware solution to check the integrity of the host OS in an
isolated environment inaccessible to the compromised machine. A snapshot of the
system memory is sent through the PCI bus to a co-processor where the integrity
is continuously checked. A counter attack against this system was demonstrated
by Rutkowska [30] in which it creates different views of the system memory to the
processor and PCI device to subvert CoPilot solution.
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CHAPTER III
EXPLORING ARCHITECTURAL SOLUTIONS
As discussed earlier, none of the software solutions are strong enough to defend the
system against rootkits. Detecting hidden VMMs is claimed to be impossible using
software techniques. This makes it necessary to have an OS -independent hardware
solution that enhances the relationship of hardware and OS and makes the system
more security aware. As stealth is the most common exploitation of rootkits, we focus
on the stealth execution of software contexts achieved by memory-based kernel rootk-
its in this work. Viewing the problem of stealth from the hardware perspective, if the
hardware has the capability to identify process contexts, the hardware can expose the
list of software contexts making use of hardware resources to the system administra-
tor. The system administrator can view this list as the master list of processes that
cannot be manipulated and compare it with the software returned list of processes.
Any mismatch implies that the software stack is trying to hide the execution of a few
processes and it can trigger and alarm. Before proposing a new micro-architectural
solution, we explored the current architectures to determine whether small changes
to the current architectures will provide hardware the capability of recognizing soft-
ware contexts. In the following sections we discuss the possible solutions and their
weaknesses.
3.1 Tagged TLB
First we considered using tagged TLB and using the contents of the PID register
to identify processes. In fact, many processors use tagged TLB to avoid flushing
TLB on every context switch. This requires the OS scheduler to load the PID of the
upcoming process in the PID register, which will be compared with the PID stored
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in the tagged TLB when there is a memory access. Using the PID register, a secured
hardware list of processes can be exported with the PIDs of all running processes. In
the beginning this appeared to be a good approach to track every software process
making use of hardware resources. But when the security evaluation was done, we
saw that this does not prevent the OS from manipulating the hardware list of PIDs.
The compromised OS can use the legitimate process’ PID to run malware. As the
TLB is tagged, it might contain VPN-PPN mappings of the legitimate process, which
will be returned when the malware process is run. To take care of these incorrect
address mappings, the TLB has to be flushed by the OS before context switching to
the malware process. For example, in the x86 architecture, the TLB can be flushed
using the INVLPG <address> instruction.
3.2 Tracking based on PDBA
In x86 architectures, every running process has a unique page global directory (PGD),
and upon a context switch to make the context switching simple, the OS has to load
the page table base address (address of the PGD) into the CR3 register. The CR3
register is used to do a hardware page table walk when there is a TLB miss. Knowing
that the CR3 value of every process is unique, we thought we could use this to
identify every process making use of hardware resources. In the beginning this looked
like a good approach because the compromised OS cannot run the malware process
by making use of the PGD base address of the legitimate process. If it is used,
the malware process will fail to see its address space and will fail to execute. The
dependency between CR3 and the execution context of the malware process appears
to make the security scheme strong. Nevertheless, it is easy for the compromised OS
to subvert this. It is as simple as swapping the page tables of a legitimate process and
malware process before context switching to the malware process and using the PGD
base address of the legitimate process. This will not expose the PGD base address of
11
the malware process to hardware.
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CHAPTER IV
SHARK: PROCESS CONTEXT AWARE
ARCHITECTURE
After exploring possible architectural solutions, it is evident that all the shortcom-
ings were due to the tightly coupled dependency of these mechanisms with the OS
itself, which could have already been compromised. As such, detecting rootkits with
the OS’s direct intervention will always fail. This makes it necessary to design a
new processor architecture that has the capability to recognize process contexts. The
rationale behind the process context aware architecture includes (1) using hardware
support for creating a new process, (2) isolating and protecting process’ address space
in a hardware-hardened sandbox so that it cannot be circumvented by the compro-
mised OS, (3) providing the capability to recognize the running process without any
direct intervention of the OS. The hardware will be able to identify the running pro-
cess without any dependence on the vulnerable software stack. This enhances the
relationship between the hardware and OS and makes it possible to achieve a process
context-aware architecture.
To achieve the above set of objectives, we propose a process context-aware ar-
chitecture called SHARK, which stands for- Secure Hardware Against RootKits. In
the proposed scheme, the master control of processes is delegated to the SHARK
Security Manager (SSM), which is a hardware engine for enforcing the security of
different process contexts. The OS carries out its regular operations under the su-
pervision and assistance of the SSM. Figure 1 gives an overview of the proposed
architecture, including the software mechanisms. The rootkit detection capability
13
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Figure 1: Architectural support for SHARK processor.
is achieved by integrating the following components into one processor: Hardware-
Assisted PID Generation,Process Page Table Encryption and Decryption, and Process
Authentication. These components are implemented within the SSM, a hardware-
based micro-architectural extension that works seamlessly with the software stack.
More details about each component are explained in the following sections.
4.1 Hardware-Assisted PID Generation
We have already seen that the PIDs generated by the OS are vulnerable to attacks,
and using this conventional approach, we cannot prevent the OS from using different
PIDs to run and conceal malware. So, Process ID Registration is the first attribute
that we introduce in the SHARK architecture. This registration of every new process
should be done by the operating system before the hardware gives the respective
process, the permission to make use of hardware resources. In other words, when
a new process is created, the Shark Security Manager (SSM) generates a new PID
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for the process and not the vulnerable OS. Note that this hardware- generated PID
need not be a secret, as it is simply used as a counter value in our counter-mode
encryption [7], to be described later. When the SSM gets a request from the OS to
generate a PID, it generates a 64-bit PID by just incrementing the PID counter and
returns the same to the OS. Even if a new process is created every cycle on a 1GHz
processor, it takes 584 years for the PID counter to overflow which is long enough
for the system to reboot and initialize the counter. This makes the hardware PID
generator very simple without any PID pool management logic. Thereafter, the OS
has to use the same PID whenever it has to run the respective process. On a context
switch, the OS has to load the PID of the upcoming process into the HPID register
which is an integral part of the SSM.
4.2 Process Page Table Encryption and Decryption
Generating the PID of every process in hardware and asking the OS to load the PID of
the respective process into the HPID register on every context switch will not prevent
the OS from using the PIDs of legitimate processes to run and conceal malware
processes. This makes it necessary to establish an enforced dependency between the
PID of the process and the execution of the process itself. This dependency can be
achieved by the the proposed Process Page Table Encryption/Decryption using the
PID of the respective process as the counter used for counter mode encryption. If the
compromised OS tries to use a different PID to run a particular process, it breaks the
dependency and will prevent the process from running. Before getting into the details
of page table encryption, we briefly review the counter-mode encryption scheme.
4.2.1 Counter Mode Encryption
Counter-mode encryption is a common symmetric-key encryption scheme [7]. It uses
a block cipher (e.g., AES [8]), a keyed invertible transform, that can be applied to
short fixed-length bit strings. To encrypt with the counter mode, one starts with a
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Figure 2: Counter-mode encryption and decryption
plaintext, a counter, a block cipher, and a secret key. An encryption key bitstream is
generated, as shown in Figure 2(a). This key bitstream is XORed with the plaintext
bit string, producing the encrypted string ciphertext. To decrypt, the same encryption
pad is computed based on the same counter and key, XORs the pad with ciphertext,
and then restores the plaintext, as shown in Figure 2(b).
Counter mode is known to be secure against chosen-plaintext attacks, meaning
the ciphertexts hide all partial information about the plaintext, even if some a priori
information about the plaintext is known. This has been formally proven in [2].
Security holds under the assumptions that the underlying block cipher is a pseudo-
random function family (this is conjectured to be true for AES) and that a new
unique counter value is used at every step. Thus a sequence number, a time stamp,
or a random number can be used as a counter value. Note that the counter is not a
secret and does not have to be encrypted.
4.2.2 Decoupled Valid Bit Array Encryption
When the OS creates a new process, it requests the SSM to generate a new PID for
the respective process and provides the address of the page global directory (PGD)
and also the first page table entry of the respective process. The SSM generates the
PID as mentioned in section 4.1. Using this newly generated PID as a counter for
encryption, the valid bit array of the PGD and the PTE mapping in the last level page
table are encrypted before returning the generated PID to the OS. In this section, we
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describe the valid-bit array encryption in the PGD. In section 4.2.3, we describe the
details of PTE encryption.
A hardware secret key is first implemented that cannot be read out by any means
similar to what was used in prior secure processors [19, 33, 35]. Using the hardware-
generated PID and the secret hardware key, the first step is to encrypt the entire
valid-bit array of the PGD in blocks of 128 bits (i.e., every 128 entries) using the
counter- mode encryption scheme. The 128-bit counter value for encryption is formed
by concatenating the hardware-generated 64-bit PID value, as shown in Figure 2(c).
This guarantees that every process has a different valid-bit array. Starting from 0 for
the first 128-bit block, the counter value will then be incremented by one for each
encrypted block.
Figure 3 shows the entire encryption process of the valid-bit array. The result of
this encryption is an encrypted bitstream stored in the original valid-bit array of the
page table. After this initial encryption, the PID that was used as the counter for
this encryption will be returned to the OS. Note that this PID is returned only after
the initial encryption. The overhead of encrypting the valid-bit array of the PGD is
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1024 V-bits/128 (input block size for AES) * 80ns = 640 ns without using a pipelined
AES implementation, which is negligible compared to the lifetime of a process.Note
that the 80 ns overhead for AES encryption is much slower than what is reported in
more recent AES engine implementation fabricated using a 0.18µm process in [12].
By means of this initial valid-bit array encryption, we establish the dependency
between the SSM and the software stack using the HPID and the hardware key. For
any subsequent page table walks to be valid, the OS cannot misguide the hardware by
using a fake PID, as the decryptions of the already encrypted page tables will fail.The
importance of valid-bit array encryption will be explained again in section 4.7.
4.2.3 Page Table Translation Encryption and Updates
The translation of the last level page table (PTE) is also encrypted. This section
gives details about this encryption. Again, for this encryption, we use counter mode
encryption and use a counter value, as shown in Figure 2(c). There is no extra
memory overhead or extra lookup logic involved for storing and searching the counter
values. These counter values are nothing but the PIDs of the respective processes
stored in the process context information.
The encryption granularity depends on the maximum physical memory that can
be supported in an architecture. For example, the x86-64 architecture supports a
maximum physical address of 40 bits in the IA-32e mode [14]. Given a 4KB page, the
physical address excluding the offset is 28 bits. According to the AES standard, the
block size for encryption and decryption is 128 bits. Hence, we propose to encrypt
four consecutive PTEs at once. Note that the current Linux uses a 4-byte integer
for each PTE and hence four consecutive PTEs are enough to store the encrypted
text. Therefore there is no memory overhead introduced in an actual implementa-
tion.Figure 4(a) shows the encryption process.
When the OS needs to update the process page table, it has to request the Shark
18
00
0
1
Actual Page Table
stored in Memory
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  














           
           
           
           
           





V
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000000
Concatenated Pipelined
Counter Mode
Encryption
Engine
(AES−128)
Counter
EV
Hardware Secret Key
HPID HPID
0x00C00000
Page Table Entry
4 PTEs
Encrypted PTE
(a) Encryption Process
Pipelined
Encryption
Engine
(AES−128)
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
EV
0x00011FF0
0x00000000
0x00000320
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000000
Ctr Mode
Encryption
Counter Mode
EV
Ctr Mode
Decryption
Ctr Mode
Decryption
Counter
HPIDHPID
Hardware Secret Key
 Encrypted PTE  Encrypted PTE
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  








           
           
           
           




  
  
  
  
  
  






       
       
       



0 0
0
1
 
−−> 00012040
New Translation
1
Co
un
te
r f
or
 
H
W
 K
ey
 
V
al
id
 b
it 
bl
oc
k
HW Key
0x00012040
0x00012040
Counter for Valid bit block
(b) Decryption Process
Figure 4: Page table update in SHARK.
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Security manager to do this. Since the v-bit array of the PGD is encrypted, the SSM
first decrypts the v-bit array of the PGD to continue with the page table walk. Then,
it reaches the last level page table and examines the four PTEs that contain the target
translation. It first decrypts the corresponding 128-bit v-bit array block of the last
level and if none of the four PTEs is valid, SSM simply sets the valid bit, re-encrypts
the 128-bit valid-bit block, and encrypts the new translation with the neighboring
invalid mappings. However, if any of the other three is valid, which means that the
128-bit encrypted PTE contains some valid mappings, SSM decrypts the encrypted
PTEs, adds the new translation, and re-encrypts to update the page table correctly.
Figure 4(b) details this procedure. To maintain the correctness of the contents of the
page tables, every update to the page table should go through the hardware-based
SSM.
4.3 SSM-managed TLB updates
If there is a TLB miss, the TLB has to be refilled by a hardware page table walk. We
target the widely distributed machines used such as the x86 and PowerPC, that use
hardware-managed TLBs and we build our security module on top of it. Since the
TLB cannot be tampered with in our SHARK architecture, we store the plaintext
translation like a regular TLB. Since the page tables are encrypted in memory, every
TLB miss is followed by a hardware page table walk and a series of decryptions before
refilling the TLB. Using the PID value of the respective process from its process
context, the SMM first decrypts the corresponding 128-bit valid-bit block in the page
directory. Then it does a hardware page table walk to reach the last level page table,
decrypts the corresponding 128-bit valid-bit array block, and finally decrypts the
encrypted PTEs before refilling the TLB. Since the right PID value should be used
for correct decryption of page tables, it is compulsory for the compromised OS to
load the PID of the malware’s process and it has to reveal its PID to the hardware
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Figure 5: TLB update handled by the SSM.
whenever it executes. This is depicted in Figure 5.
4.4 Instructions supported in SHARK
Three new instructions are supported in the SHARK architecture, which are listed
in Table 1. The GENPID instruction has to be used by the OS when the first
memory page is assigned to a newly created process’ address space. As described in
section 4.1, when there is a request from the OS to generate a new PID, the SSM
increments the PID counter and uses the same PID as the counter to encrypt the
following: (1) valid-bit array of the page directory, (2) valid-bit array of the last level
page table, (3) page table translation (VPN-PPN) in the last level page table, It then
returns the generated PID back to the OS. The MODPT instruction is required by the
memory management module of the OS to directly update the page tables of processes
whenever the kernel swaps out and swaps in memory pages. MODPT decrypts the
encrypted PTE, inserts the new mapping and re-encrypts the PTE back to maintain
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correctness. In addition to this, in order to track the physical pages of this particular
process, if we are invalidating the PTE (e.g., when swapping a page out), the MODPT
needs to compute the SHA-256 [32] checksum of the memory page and encrypt the
checksum using the PID of the process as the counter for encryption before swapping
out the page.This is illustrated in Figure 6(a). The resulting 32B encrypted checksum
accounts for 0.8% space overhead for every 4KB page, to prevent a particular attack,
as described in section 4.7. This extra operation is designed to further strengthen
the association of the memory page and the owning process.The reverse operation is
performed when a MODPT is used to validate a previously mapped PTE (swapping
a page in). Before updating the respective PTE, it checks whether the memory page
is owned by the process.(Note that this check is not performed while swapping-in the
memory page for the first time and the MAPPED bit (M-bit) in every PTE keeps
track of whether or not the virtual page is mapped and cannot be modified by OS and
is completely managed by SSM. Also note that there is no extra memory overhead
to have this extra bit, as this is present in today’s Linux kernel implementation.)
This authentication is achieved by computing the checksum of the memory page,
encrypting the checksum, and comparing it with the stored encrypted checksum.
Match in the checksums implies that the memory page is truly owned by the process
and the update is legal. After this authentication, the PTE of the page table is
modified, which is illustrated in Figure 6(b). Note that because of maintaining and
encrypting the checksum of the page when we are moving the physical pages from
one PTE to another, SHARK always keeps track of the ownership of this page and so
the compromised OS cannot modify the PTE of a legitimate process and map it to a
malware’s page to conceal malware’s page tables. Finally, the DECPT instruction is
required if the kernel wants to directly read the page table contents.
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Table 1: Privilege instruction support in SHARK.
Instruction Definition Functions
GENPID Generate a new PID Initial Valid-bit array and PTE encryption is performed,
M-bit of the respective PTE is set, hardware generated
PID is returned
MODPT Update the page table Useful when the kernel directly updates page tables
of a process of processes
(a) If the page is swapped-in for the first time
(M-bit = 0), it sets the M-bit and updates the
PTE with the new mapping.
(b) If M-bit = 1 and MODPT is used to
invalidate a memory page (swapping-out), SHA-256
hash of the memory page is computed and encrypted
before swapping out the page
(c) If M-bit = 1 and MODPT is used to validate a
memory page (swapping-in), SHA-256 hash of the
memory page is computed, encrypted and compared
with the stored encrypted hash to check whether
the memory page is owned by the process before
updating the PTE
DECPT Decrypt a process’ Useful if the kernel needs to know the physical addresses
page table entry by directly reading the page tables
4.5 Process Authentication
If the compromised OS tries to use a hijacked PID from a different process, the
end result of the process page table decryption will result in an incorrect physical
page number, which, if used, will prevent the execution of malware. The proposed
page table encryption and decryption are novel ideas that offer one more level of
virtualization provided by the secure hardware for the OS, putting all processes under
examination by SHARK.From a security standpoint, this consolidates the binding
between the hardware and OS, giving the hardware the capability of controlling and
authenticating the execution of software contexts through the address translation
process. The whole scheme of PID generation in hardware, page table encryption
based on this PID, and decryption based on the same PID in hardware enables the
system to perform Process Authentication.
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4.6 Stealth Checker
This section discusses the last component of SHARK which is called Stealth Checker.
With the SSM hardware extensions, every running process is controlled and revealed
by the hardware. These hardware extensions make sure that the OS cannot fool
the hardware and enforces the OS to reveal the details of every running process
context to the hardware. But these hardware extensions cannot prevent OS from
manipulating software system administrator utilities to hide malware processes. For
example, even if the hardware knows about every running process, it does not prevent
the malware from manipulating ”ps” and ”top” to hide malware processes from system
administrators. So the hardware list of processes is meaningless if it is not safely
exported to the system administrator. This exported master list of processes can
be compared with the software list returned by the tampered utilities and evaluate
the differences. This functionality is implemented by Stealth Checker and it triggers
an alarm to the system administrator when the information revealed by software
utilities like ”ps” and ”top” is not consistent with the information from bare hardware.
For the above mentioned scheme to be secure and effective, we have to prevent the
compromised OS from intervening and subverting the master list of PIDs exported
by the hardware. Designing such a trusted feedback passage between the hardware
and anti-rootkit software is very crucial for identifying stealthy processes.
We propose to implement the stealth checker in firmware which is caller prior to
every context switch. Every write to the HPID register triggers this exception and
the exception handler reads the contents of the HPID register and gets the PID if the
upcoming process. There are no security implications till this stage because every-
thing is controlled by the hardware or firmware. Even though the firmware can be
upgraded by the OS, it requires a system restart that clears out the memory-based
rootkits that we target. After the HPID read, the PID with previously buffered PIDs
are encrypted and sent to a remote system administrator for examination. This small
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packet of 128-Bytes accommodates 64-bit PIDs of 16 processes. The firmware sends
this data once every 10 context switches, which reduces the network activity even
more. Unlike CoPilot technique, which send out plain memory pages for examina-
tion, our firmware encrypts this data using a 128-bit key assigned by the system
administrator on firmware installation. Even though we are sending the data packet
to the remote machine by making use of insecure OS services, the OS cannot com-
promise this list as it is encrypted. To make it more secure, sequence numbers can be
employed in each data packet to prevent OS from using replay or blocking attacks.
If the OS attempts to block the packets sent by the handler, the system adminis-
trator sitting on the remote machine can conclude that the OS is compromised and
take appropriate actions. On the other side, the remote machine can decrypt the
data packets from the host machine and maintain an event log of process contexts
running on the host. He can use ssh to remotely connect to the suspected machines
and execute ”ps” like commands to check the process list returned by their OS. This
procedure can be completely automated. Any mismatch will alert one to a probable
security breach.
The major sources of overhead for the exception handler are (1) time taken by the
kernel network stack to update NIC buffers, and (2) network bandwidth utilized. The
minimum time slice in the Linux kernel 2.6 is 5ms, the maximum is 800ms and the
average being 100ms. Taking into account the maximum context switching frequency,
we have to send 128B data over the network every 50ms (once in 10 context switches).
Based on our measurements, the average kernel TCP stack overhead to send 128B is
less than 0.1 ms and the network bandwidth utilized is negligible. This reduces the
overhead of Stealth Checker below 0.2% and makes it highly practical.
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4.7 Strength of SHARK
In this section, we discuss the potential future threat models and we analyze how
SHARK processor can defend against these attacks. We thought about many future
exploits that can be devised to subvert SHARK knowing that the OS cannot be
trusted. SHARK has the capability to prevent all these malicious attempts carried
out by untrusted OS.
First, if rootkits hijack a legitimate process’ PID to conceal malware’s PID, it
results in incorrect decryption of address mappings and makes sure that the malware
hiding process does not execute. Note that the encryption is seamless, established
using the HPID when the process and its page directory are created.
In another attack, the rootkit may plan to encrypt the page tables of a malware
process using the PID of a hijacked process. Once this is achieved, the malware
process can always run by using the PID of the legitimate process. This attack will
fail because any update to the page table has to first decrypt the Valid-bit array of the
PGD. If the rootkit tries to use a different PID in between and update the respective
page table, the valid bit array of PGD will result in incorrect decryption.
Now, we will talk about the significance of valid-bit array encryption of the first
level page table. If we do not encrypt the first level page table, and just encrypt the
last level translations, one attack model can successfully break the defense mechanism
of SHARK and use a legitimate process’ PID for malware’s execution. The attack
model is described here- We know that the last level page tables are constructed on-
demand, depending on the memory footprint of the application. When the second
last level page table is constructed, the contents will not be encrypted by SSM and
the OS can use MODPT instruction to encrypt the contents based on a legitimate
process’ PID. From this point, all the subsequent translations, will be encrypted based
on the other process’ PID. This will result in just one last level page table, encrypted
using malware’s PID and the rest encrypted based on some legitimate process’ PID.
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If the malware application uses page tables other than the first one (encrypted based
on malware’s PID), it can successfully execute by using the legitimate process’ PID.
To defend against this attack, we encrypt the root node of the page table (first level)
so that, all the subsequent modifications (on-demand construction of last level page
table) should be first authenticated by the successful decryption of the first level page
table. This makes sure that malware’s page tables are not constructed using other
legitimate process’ PID.
In another attack model is to have the malware invalidate all the allocated malware
pages and swap all the malware pages to the disk. Then the malware will start over
and encrypt the blank page table using a hijacked PID of a legitimate process before
it is brought back to the memory. This is not possible, dues to the encryption of
the valid bit array of the last level page tables. The PTE invalidation will also cause
page table updates that will subsequently encrypt the valid bits of the page table.
Even if the pages are swapped out, the page table will still have valid bits encrypted
and the hardware page walk mechanism will exercise the SSM-enforced decryption
for invoking page faults. If they are not decrypted and re-encrypted correctly, the
page table will never be updated properly.
One may wonder why the OS cannot simply update the page table with its own
encrypted valid bit array and mappings since it knows both the PIDs and the page
tables are in memory. This is impossible since the hardware burn-in secret key cannot
be read by the OS by any means. It is hardwired into AES engine for performing
encryption and decryption. This makes this threat model not feasible.
Another attack could manipulate a legitimate process’ page table and address
space to run malware. Two types of this attack could be launched: (1) Using the
MODPT instruction, modify a duplicate copy of a legitimate process’ page table to
map to malware’s physical pages. Note that the OS has all the information required
— physical pages used for malware and legitimate processes’ decrypted page table
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structures; (2) Use legitimate process’ address space to run malware— swapping
malware code and data to legitimate process’ memory pages and using manipulated
legitimate process’ page tables to run malware. Note that this attack is an extreme
strategy to hide malware and is very difficult to achieve. Even if the above attacks
can be somehow devised by malware, SHARK will be successful in defending against
them. This is achieved by the SHA-256 checksum mechanism described in section 4.4
and its encryption, which gives SSM the capability to track the ownership of memory
pages. This will not allow the OS to manipulate the page tables to point to memory
pages used by other processes on-the-fly or use other process’ PID to use its memory
pages while it is still executing.
Last but not least, we know that sophisticated virtual machine-based rootkits
[16, 29, 25] are emerging these days; we will discuss the implications of SHARK
architecture on these rootkits in this section. In virtual machine-based rootkits, the
malicious software uses either hardware support for virtualization or modify the boot
files so that the VMM boots under the host OS. Once the VMM starts operating
under the host OS, it is completely compromised. Now let us discuss the challenge of
identifying the nested VMM’s installed using hardware virtualization support in [25].
By using SHARK, we can effectively combat the problem of identifying these hidden
virtual machines. Private page tables, shadow page tables and nested page tables
using hardware technology in AMD processors are the techniques used by BluePill
malware to hide the malware VMMs in memory. By using SHARK hardware, the
new page tables created in the hypervisor must be registered to obtain a key and then
pass through SSM process authentication before executing these contexts. Using this
technique, even if the malware is able to hide its page tables from the host OS and
integrity checking tools, it cannot fake its identity to the hardware. In this way, the
proposed SSM has control over the VMMs, too. The PIDs of contexts inside VMMs
are logged continuously in hardware and revealed to system administrator.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Two sets of experiments were conducted to evaluate the proposed SHARK architec-
ture. First, we evaluated the practicality and strength of the proposed scheme against
malware running in stealth using real kernel rootkits available on Linux. Following
that, we performed performance experiments to quantify the overheads incurred by
the SHARK architecture.
5.1 Functionality Evaluation
As a proof of concept, several rootkits were installed on Linux OS running on top
of an emulated SHARK architecture. To emulate the entire system, including the
SHARK security manager, Bochs, a highly portable open source x86 PC emulator
was used.
The proposed scheme was verified to be practical by modifying the memory man-
agement unit, process management unit and the scheduler of the Linux kernel versions
2.2.14 and 2.6.16.33 to use the SSM implemented in Bochs to support our proposed
mechanism. Using these new instructions supported by SHARK (shown in Table 1),
the kernel was modified. The modified kernel boots and executes all the processes
perfectly with encrypted page tables. To support pointers to kernel page tables in all
user page tables, on a TLB miss we differentiate between kernel space and user space
memory access and use appropriate counter value for decryption. Shared libraries is
not an issue because of if two page tables lead you to a shared physical page, different
PIDs will be used to encrypt their respective page tables. Also the SHA-256 hash for
the shared page can be encrypted using the respective PIDs of the processes, sharing
the memory page. In virtualization systems, the lowest layer, i.e. the hypervisor,
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must use the ISA support provided by SHARK.
The security evaluation was performed by installing rootkits over the modified
kernel for SHARK running over the emulated SHARK hardware architecture. The
following five rootkits collected from [22] were inserted into the base kernel as Load-
able Kernel Modules (LKMs): Adore 0.42, Knark 2.4.3, Phide, Enyelkm.en.v1.1, and
Mood-nt-2.3. Note that the above rootkits are for different kernel versions. The first
three rootkits attack Linux 2.2 kernel, while the last two were developed for the linux
2.6 kernel. These rootkits were inserted as LKMs and can access the kernel space
and can modify the system call table, interrupt descriptor table to alter the execu-
tion flow of the compromised OS, and provide utilities to conceal malware’s processes
from the system administrator’s utilities (e.g., ps, top). Using this setup we contrived
a compromised software stack to be able to assess the effectiveness of our SHARK
architecture. The base kernel’s scheduler was modified to load the HPID register
with the PID of the process prior to each context switch and every write to the HPID
triggered an exception service by the stealth checker. As described in section 4.6,
the exception handler in the firmware cannot be compromised as it is a firmware.
In this way, the PIDs of running processes are read by the firmware and a golden
list of processes is created. The compromised utilities such as ps or top were queried
to obtain a list of processes. The rootkit tries to hide the information of malware
processes from this list. By comparing these two lists, hidden malware processes were
detected and it triggered security alarms to reveal the processes running in stealth,
demonstrating effectiveness of our SHARK architecture.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
In order to protect process page tables, SHARK introduces extra encryption/decryption
overhead. In this section we evaluate this overhead’s impact on performance. Cycle
information was obtained from Virtutech’s Simics [20] with its gcache model enabled.
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Table 2: Processor System Configurations
Configuration freq L1 L2 AES latency SHA-256 Memory
latency latency
Config1
2GHz
2MB, 12 cycles 80
138 200
Config2 32KB, 8-way 8-way, 64B line 160
Config3 64B line,2 cycles 4MB, 19 cycles 80
Config4 16-way, 64B line 160
Config5
4GHz
2MB, 25 cycles 160
276 300
Config6 32KB, 8-way 8-way, 64B line 240
Config7 64B line, 3 cycles 4MB, 38 cycles 160
Config8 16-way, 64B line 240
Note that we could not perform functional evaluation using Simics because some
modules e.g., Page Table Walks, are not open sourced and hence we could not modify
them to model our SHARK implementation. A staller will stall the cycle accounting
mechanism whenever a cache miss occurs. Since Simics does not provide an out-
of-order cycle-level single-processor model and the staller essentially implements a
blocking cache, our overhead estimation may be somewhat pessimistic. To model a
modern processor, we chose our cache and TLB configurations to closely resemble
those in the Core microarchitecture such as Conroe core from Intel.The cache access
times were estimated based on Cacti 4.2 [18] with two target frequencies specified in
Table 2. We assume there are two read/write ports for L1 and one unified read/write
port and one snoop read port for the L2. Note that, x86 ISA supports mixed page
sizes; thus there are two TLBs for two different page sizes: 4KB and 2MB, used for
each machine. We also varied the number of TLB entries to study their sensitivity.
Furthermore, we studied the sensitivity of the AES engine latency. We assume that
a baseline 10-round AES-128 takes 80 cycles on a 2GHz processor, similar to an op-
timized design reported in [15]. Then we increase the latency for different machine
configurations. We assume that a baseline pipelined SHA-256 hashing engine takes
138 cycles on 2GHz processor, similar to the implementation in [5]. Then we increase
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Figure 7: Performance impact with different TLB organizations (Config1)
this latency for the faster processor. The entire configurations are listed in Table 2.
We chose 28 SPEC 2006 programs as our benchmark, using a reference input
set. For each simulation, we emulated the first two billion instructions including
instructions from the OS code. We did not fast-forward instructions, in order to
obtain more page faults and TLB updates. In reality, the overall overhead should be
much smaller. Linux kernel 2.6.16.33 was recompiled to send requests to the SHARK
security manager whenever a page table update and PTE decryption were needed.
When the SSM gets a request to update PTE, it encrypts the PTE and updates the
page table. This requires one valid bit array decryption + one PTE decryption +
one PTE re-encryption + one valid bit array encryption. Also on every page table
update, we need to compute SHA-256 hash of the 4KB page and encrypt the 32B
hash. This adds an overhead of SHA-256 hashing latency + two AES Encryptions.
The overall overhead for a page table update will be six times the AES latency +
SHA-256 hashing latency. Also, we have to decrypt the the corresponding PTE for
each TLB refill. This requires two valid bit array decryptions + one PTE decryption.
A TLB miss to handle hardware page table walk is conservatively assumed to be
30 cycles. More penalty in the baseline TLB miss will dilute our overhead. The
actual page faults are handled by the OS code and these explicit OS instructions
were accounted for in the emulation. The page table updates, page table decryptions,
and the TLB updates account for the sources of overhead. Also, we need to flush the
TLB upon every context switch as in x86 machines.
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Figure 8: Number of D-TLB updates for TLB Config1 and TLB Config2
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Figure 9: Number of context switches (amid 2 billion instructions)
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Figure 10: Average overheads for all the benchmarks with different configurations
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Figure 7 shows the cycle time overhead for all the benchmark programs running
with six different TLB organizations using Processor Config1. We observed that TLB
organizations are critical to the overheads. Obviously, some benchmark programs
such as 401.bzip2, 410.bwaves, 459.GemsFDTD, 470.lbm, 998.rand, and 999.rand require
more than 2MB page mappings in the TLB. For these applications, when we increased
the number of entries in the large TLB (for 2MB page) from eight to 32, the overhead
was drastically reduced below 1%. To gain further insight,figure 8 shows the number
of data TLB updates for TLB Config1 and TLB Config2.We found the numbers of
i-TLB updates of different TLB sizes almost remain the same. The only difference
between these two configurations is the number of TLB entries for 2MB pages. It
is evident that the same benchmark programs show a huge reduction in the d-TLB
updates when more translation entries are employed in the 2MB-page TLB.
In figure 7, 401.bzip2, 410.bwaves, and 470.lbm also demonstrate higher overhead
than the others. This can be explained by examining the context switch frequencies
shown in figure 9. These three show a much higher number of context switches, a few
orders or magnitude higher than the others. As the TLBs are flushed during each
context switch, we will need to refill the TLB more often, causing the extra overheads
in decryption.
Finally, in figure 10, we show the average overhead for all benchmarks across the
eight processor system configurations described in Table 2 with six TLB organizations.
For the same generation processor, moving to a larger L2 cache tends to lower the
overhead (e.g., Config1 vs. Config3). This is because the longer L2 latency for a larger
cache penalizes the baseline and shrinks the overhead proportionally. In general,
SHARK merely introduced 4.7% overhead in the worse case, and the overhead is
below 1% when a larger TLB (e.g., 4-way, 256 entries) is used.
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CHAPTER VI
RELATED WORK
To detect kernel mode rootkits, many software techniques have been proposed [4,
26, 36, 28, 27]. These software solutions operate in the same corrupted software
stack and they expect that some kernel components cannot be compromised. But,
sophisticated rootkits subvert these trusted kernel components to defeat anti-rootkit
solutions. These software solutions were dependable when they were released, but
because of the increasing complexity of the rootkits, they are not considered to be
secure. The hardware solution, CoPilot, mentioned in section 2.4, was proven to be
insecure by Joanna Rutkowska in [30]. Also, note that this is not a micro-architectural
approach, but rather a system-level solution that was proposed to deal with the
problem.
Many researchers have proposed the idea of checking the integrity of the host OS
using virtual machine monitors (VMMs) [9, 31]. These VMMs are typically optimized
to be a thin software layer, and the security manager inside the VMM verifies the
integrity of the host OS. These techniques are no longer safe because of rootkits,
like Blue Pill , that are exploiting hardware virtualization support [29]. Bluepill
is proved to work under the XEN hypervisor [37]. So we cannot trust the VMM
and run anti-rootkit tools in VMM too. It is shown in [25] that, today, none of the
techniques can detect virtualization-based rootkits. SHARK is a micro-architectural
solution and that can address virtual machine-based rootkits effectively, as discussed
in section 4.7.
Untrusted OS is not a new problem for the micro-architectural research community
[35, 19]. These architectures were proposed to have a secure execution environment
36
without a secured kernel.The main applications that they consider here do not need
interactions with the host OS. Their goal is to protect the application’s code and data
from being tampered with, including the untrusted OS. The attack model that we
are considering in this work is different in that the malicious kernel will not try to
manipulate the code and data of other applications. Instead, malware uses computing
resources stealthily and persists in the system as long as possible without affecting
other applications. In ARM-based TrustZone Technology [1], an isolated on-chip
execution environment is made available for security purposes. This design is not
a solution for any vulnerability, but rather a framework that allows one to devise
secure systems. This approach is not tightly coupled with the OS, which can cause
an endless battle between the secure and non-secure regions. We cannot use Intel’s
TPM technology [13] to solve our particular problem. Even though TPM provides a
trusted base that cannot be modified by the corrupted OS, we cannot use this feature
to recognize processes in TPM firmware. If TPM has to control processes running
in OS, it has to run below the OS as a VMM. It is not possible to implement the
VMM in TPM as TPM runs in its private memory and hypervisor is meant to run in
shared memory under the host OS. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
propose micro-architectural support, to enhance the security of the OS to deal with
applications running in stealth.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE WORK
In this section we describe the possible extensions of SHARK that will be very useful
for similar security applications.
We know that SHARK just operates at the process context level and all the threads
of the process share the same PID. To have a more fine-grained control of software
contexts, the next step would be to authenticate every thread running on the system.
This would help if the malware were just spawning new threads and running as a part
of a legitimate process.
The other possible extension to SHARK would be to associate every network
connection (I/O) with its owning process and expose this to the system administrator.
This would be useful if the network were exploited by some hiding malware in the
system. It would provide an opportunity for the system administrator to know what
exactly is happening on the bare hardware.
Virtualization has become the modern trend and is widely used to abstract soft-
ware stacks away from underlying hardware resources. Since the lowest layer of
software (VMM) has the entire responsibility of securing the system and because of
emerging attacks on VMMs to subvert the enitre software stack (e.g., widely used
XEN hypervisor is proved to be vulnerable), we have to closely inspect the loop holes
of VMMs, which can be exploited by hackers. It would be very beneficial to protect
the integrity of this lowest-layer of software(hypervisor) by securely sand-boxing this
layer of software. Instead of running the hypervisor in the shared memory that is
accessible to all the guest domains, we propose running this critical software layer in
a protected memory region that is accessible to a single master core. This results in
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complete physical isolation of the hypervisor memory from guest OSes. This master-
core also has access to the shared memory of the guest-cores and hence can provide
hypercall services to guest-cores. Master-core does not run any guest domains and
is available only for hypervisor services, making it impossible for guest domains to
modify the hypervisor memory. Additional hardware support should be provided for
hypercall communication from slave cores to the master cores.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Rootkit-based exploits have become a serious concern in cyber-security. Once a com-
puter is infected, rootkits are detrimental, tenacious, and difficult to identify and
remove. Typical applications of rootkits perform key-logging to reveal passwords,
sniffing network traffic to steal secrets, and controlling zombie machines to stage
other attacks such as email spamming, denial-of-service attacks, etc. They exploit the
kernel’s vulnerabilities to gain root privileges and continue to run their malware ap-
plications on compromised machines. These malware processes operate completely in
stealth, leaving no trace for system administrators. To address these issues, this the-
sis, proposes an autonomic architecture called SHARK that operates against stealth
achieved by rootkits’ exploits. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
addressing rootkit exploits using a synergistic hardware/system software approach to
directly enhance the trust between the hardware and the processes under a compro-
mised OS. SHARK is process context-aware; it employs secure hardware support to
provide system-level security, without trusting the software stack, including the OS
kernel. The proposed mechanisms, including hardware PID, page table encryption,
and process authentication, tightly couple the dependency between the OS and hard-
ware architecture, making the entire system more security-aware. Under SHARK,
the concealed malware at user, kernel and VMM levels of the software stack will
be revealed automatically by the synergistic cooperation between SHARK and the
software stack.
Running Linux OS and installing real-life rootkits, our experimental results show
40
that SHARK is highly effective in identifying rootkits with less than 4.7% perfor-
mance impact in the worst case and less than 1% performance degradation in typical
processor configurations.
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